The main objective of antitrust interventions is to assure competition in markets to benefit consumers. This paper challenges this common approach by examining the case of a satellite broadcasting network with monopoly power. First, Satellite TV is identified as a two-sided market.
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Introduction
The main focus of antitrust interventions is on the likely effect on competition and the main goal is to sustain competitive markets.
1 However, a subset of markets exists where competition is not always beneficial to welfare: two-sided markets. A two sided market emerges when there is demand for transactions between two groups of people but they cannot interact with each other. It is characterized by the necessity of an intermediary between the groups of end users.
The optimal prices in two sided markets do not necessarily equal marginal costs as the Lerner condition states (Lerner, 1934; Evans, 2003, p.193) . Hence, an intermediary with monopoly power does not inevitably lead to a reduction in welfare. For example, Rochet & Tirole (2003) show the price structure of a platform with monopoly power facing linear demand curves in a two-sided market is identical to that of a benevolent "Ramsey".
This paper examines the case of a satellite broadcasting network with monopoly power in the framework of a two-sided market and argues that it will not use this power to the disadvantage of consumers as his profits and overall welfare is maximized at the same point: when the semi-elasticity of the amount of consumers in regard to the per-interaction-price equals that of the TV stations. An antitrust authority should take this finding into account when evaluating the potential introduction of a fee to receive TV via satellite as was planned (but not accomplished) in 2006 in Germany.
Section 2 of this paper points out the main characteristics of two-sided markets and introduces the canonical model of two-sided markets developed by Rochet & Tirole (2004) . Section 3 identifies the market for TV broadcasting as a two-sided market and adopts the canonical model to deduce the price structure which maximizes profits for a platform with monopoly power and shows that it equals the welfare optimal price structure. Section 4 highlights the limitations of the analysis and concludes that antitrust cases in two-sided markets should take a more in-depth look at the effect of market power before deciding that competition is always best for consumers.
1 See for example the horizontal merger guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (DOJ & FTC, 1997) .
Characteristics of Two-Sided Markets
On the one hand, two-sided markets (and multi-sided markets respectively) are characterized by an intermediary, whose platform is necessary for transactions between different groups of end users, for example buyers and sellers (Evans 2003) . The end users do not have direct contact and therefore cannot bargain with each other. The intermediary interacts with both parties and is situated between them. The conveyed transactions raise the utility of the end users and the intermediary gets paid for enabling them. 3 Contrary to the common vertical view on market, in which the platform is only in contact with one side, a horizontal view of the market evolves (see figure 1 ).
2 The origin of the term "network externality" lies in the telecommunications industry and describes advantages of compatibility of the users of one network, for example the telecommunication network, which depend considerably on the amount of other users in the network (Adams, 2004) . 3 The reservation utility of the end users is zero, so their utility in using the platform has to be higher than the demanded fee by the intermediary.
On the other hand, a two sided market is characterized by the attempt of the intermediary to get both sides "on board" by optimizing the structure of the access fees.
The attribute "optimal" implies, that the breakup of the fees between the end users is not neutral to the result as the Coase theorem suggests. This non-validity of the Coase theorem is given, when the end users cannot allocate the resources efficiently through bargaining (Rochet & Tirole, 2004, p. 14) , for example because of missing bargaining options (they do not have contact with each other as the market is anonymous), information asymmetries, or transaction costs. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a two sided market (Rochet & Tirole, 2004, p. 10 ).
In two-sided markets the network effects and therefore the utility of a member of one side of the market depends on how many users act on the other side of the platform (Armstrong, 2006) . Hence, network effects do not (only) occur in between the members of one group of end users but (also) between the different groups of end users. Thus, two sided markets are characterized by indirect network effects (Evans, 2003, p. 192) . These indirect network externalities would not be (completely) internalized without an intermediary (Rochet & Tirole, 2004, p. 3) . Two-sided markets therefore differ from the traditional view of classic microeconomics (Rochet & Tirole, 2003, p. 991) , in which externalities are internalized by the end users.
In combination with the non-neutral effect of (re)allocation of resources, the internalization of the externalities between the groups of end users accounts for the main 
Definition of two sided-markets
A market is two-sided, if a platform is necessary for transactions between market participants and the volume of conducted transactions between the market participants depend on the price structure for using the platform. Technically, let T be the amount of transactions between two groups of market participants and z the total of charged fees for using the platform. 
The canonical model of two-sided markets
After defining two sided markets and highlighting their characteristics in the last subsection, now the mathematical, so called "canonical", model of two sided markets by Rochet & Tirole (2004) is introduced. 7 This model is afterwards used to picture the market for broadcasting and evaluating the effect of market power.
To begin with, consider a single platform, P, which connects both sides, i ∈ (1)
whereat N j describes the amount of users of the other side of the market. The amount of users on side i is:
Let the per-interaction-price be defined as:
After inserting (3) into (1) and transforming
, the demand function for N i is the following:
Note that the demand function only depends on the amount of members on the other side of the market, N j , and the per-interaction price, p i . The solution of equation (4) in equilibrium is characterized by the amount of members of both groups, N A and
The profit of the platform, π , is derived by the following function:
and can be transformed to:
The all round price,p = p A + p B , is given, so that the optimal price structure can be derived by maximizing the volume of transactions, T:
The total price is set by the standard Lerner formula:
is the price elasticity of the transaction volume. The optimal price structure is obtained, when the derivations of the transaction volume with re- Note that only the semi-elasticities are relevant, because the total price is given and only the price structure is of concern. The derivatives of n A und n B are given by the total differentials of N A and N B in equation (4): Regarding special case (1): Using equation (4) it can be shown that, under the as-
is true. Equation (10) then can be simplified to:
If fixed costs and fixed utility for the end users are absent, the loss of a transaction on side i due to an increase in p i leads to opportunity costs in the extent of V -p j . The optimal price structure is then:
The optimal price structure of the special case (ii) is for this paper not important enough to offset the complexity of its derivation. Hence, the optimal price structure for homogeneous variable utility of a transaction for all end users is just mentioned 
TV Broadcasting as a Two-Sided Market
In section 2 two-sided markets were defined and their major characteristics were presented. In addition the canonical model of two sided markets developed by Rochet und Tirole (2004) was introduced. Building on this preparation, this section focuses on the welfare effect of a fee to receive satellite TV. First, the market of TV broadcasting is identified as a two-sided market and modeled according to the canonical model. With this help, the condition is elaborated under which the introduction of a fee to receive satellite TV is increasing welfare.
11 For the derivation see Rochet und Tirole (2004) p. 24f. 
Modeling the Market for TV Broadcasting
The market for TV broadcasting persists of the broadcasting networks as platforms, P, the TV stations, TV, and the consumers, C. The broadcasting networks act as an intermediary for the transactions between the TV viewers and the TV stations. The consumers and the TV stations do not interact directly and therefore have no opportunity to balance out potential inefficiencies. Hence, the allocation of resources in form of the price structure is not neutral and plays a major role in this market. Regarding the above definition in section 2.2, the TV broadcasting market is a twosided market and the canonical model for two-sided markets, introduced in section 2.3, can be applied.
Assume only one satellite broadcasting network, S, exists and other broadcasting networks, especially cable networks, can be disregarded. The latter is justified by the high sunk costs in form of installation costs the consumers face when they want to switch platforms, also called switching costs. This gives the satellite network some scope for changing prices without losing customers to cable networks, at least in the short run and/or for small increases in prices. The reason for disregarding other competitors in the submarket of satellite broadcasting is that the model would otherwise get highly complex without deepening the insights as the results are nearly identical (Rochet & Tirole, 2004, p. 998) . 12 For an analysis of competing platforms in two-sided markets, see Armstrong (2006) , which may be of particular interest for the market of TV broadcasting as it accounts for multi-homing 13 .
The consumers acquire the utility, β, if they watch a TV show. The amount of watched shows depends on the amount of TV stations, N TV , on the platform and therefore on the utility of the TV stations on the other side of the platform. In addition, they pay a fixed According to equation (1) the consumers get a utility of: 12 Rochet & Tirole even mention: "The following analysis is complex [… and …] can be skipped in a first reading" (Rochet & Tirole, 2003 , p. 1002 . 13 Multi-homing means that one market side is engaged on more or even all platforms and the decision to join one platform is independent on the decision to join another one. This is true for the broadcasting market, as most TV stations can be received via all broadcasting platforms.
(15)
The TV stations produce TV shows of any kind with fixed costs in the extent of C TV , send these via the platform to the consumers, and pay the platform a fixed, 
The satellite broadcaster receives the fees from the consumers and the TV stations and has to pay fixed costs to maintain its network in the extent of C S . Fixed costs per member of the platform as well as variable costs per transaction do not occur (V = F i = 0). Hence, the following utility/profit function for S evolves according to equation (5):
The per-interaction-price is defined using an analog approach to equation (3):
The numbers of consumers and TV stations on the platform derive from equations (2) and (4):
The solution of equation (17) is characterized in equilibrium by the number of members on both sides of the market, N C and N TV , as functions of p C and p TV :
14 The assumption of the canonical model is that there are no negotiations and no payments between the end users of a platform. Therefore, pay TV and some kinds of public TV stations, which for example exist in Germany, are out of the scope of the model in this paper.
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). The profit of S can then be stated analog to equation (6):
Using a similar approach as in section 2, the following optimal price structure evolves: , the end users only differ in regard to their variable utility α and β and the assumptions of special case (i) are met. Analog to section 2, the optimal price structure for the satellite network is then:
, whereat V = 0 is assumed (see above) so that:
Is Monopoly Power Harmful to Consumers?
The model in this paper examines a market where the satellite broadcasting network has monopoly power: It is the only network in the submarket for satellite broadcasting and the high switching costs to other standards allow him to change prices, at least to some degree, without losing consumers to other platforms like cable TV.
12
in 2006 in Germany when the satellite broadcasting network SES Astra tried to introduce a fee to receive TV via satellite (FAZ 2006a) . However, they dropped that intention because the German antitrust authority ("Bundeskartellamt") revealed that it will intervene (FAZ 2006) and the case never went to court.
Until now, people in Germany do not pay fees to receive TV via satellite; technically: p C = 0. This means that everybody watches TV shows as long as his utility of consuming is larger than his opportunity costs 17 and he already owns a TV (which is true for 92% of all households in Germany 18 ). The question is, if a satellite broadcasting network with monopoly power would introduce a fee for consumers with the intention to absorb consumer rent and the effect of decreasing the overall welfare.
To estimate this, consider the situation of a benevolent legislator, a "Ramsey", who maximizes the overall welfare, U.
(24)
U consists of the aggregated utility functions of all involved parties. To aggregate the utility functions of the consumers and the TV stations, equations (15) and (16) have to be multiplied with N C and N TV , respectively. As the satellite network is the only platform in the model, equation (17) can be employed directly. The overall welfare function is then:
const. This condition is necessary to implement the canonical model of Rochet and Tirole. However, in an antitrust case the fee introduced for the consumers would not completely passed through to the TV stations as the platform wants to absorb some of the rent. Therefore, as is often the case in complex models, the outcome highly depends on the assumptions. It is suggested that further research modifies the model by implementing a non-constant overall price.
If the condition of constant overall prices, then the introduction of a fee for the con- This is true until the semi elasticities equal each other.
From the perspective of the satellite broadcasting network, the optimal structure of the fees is reached, as shown in equation (21), when the semi-elasticities equal each other -exactly the point where the transaction volume and welfare are maximized.
This can also be illustrated graphically (see figure 2 ). In conclusion: No matter how much market power a satellite broadcasting network has, it would not choose a price structure which is not optimal to welfare. This holds true for the assumption that the total price for all end users is constant (p = p C + p TV = const.). The economic reason behind is that platforms have an incentive to internalize all (indirect) network externalities. This incentive is also an argument to maximize the transaction volume even if the platform could increase prices for one side without passing them through to the other side (p ≠ const.).
If there is competition in the market, the outcome could be different. One idea to implement competition is to incorporate a hotelling procedure (Hotelling, 1931) with high address costs into the model. However, this is beyond the scope of this
Conclusion
This paper challenges the common assumption of antitrust law that competition is always beneficial for consumers and overall welfare. Its focus is on two sided markets and, in particular, on a satellite broadcasting network with monopoly power.
The framework of analysis is the canonical model for two-sided market, developed by Rochet & Tirole (2004) .
After identifying the market for television broadcasting as a two-sided market with consumers on one side and TV stations on the other, it is shown that a satellite broadcasting network maximizes his profits by choosing a price structure where the semi-elasticity of the amount of consumers in regard to the per-interaction-price equals that of the TV stations. This is exactly the point where the transaction volume and overall welfare is maximized. Thus, even a platform with high monopoly power would not deviate from the welfare optimal price structure. However, this result might change if competition is introduced and should be investigated in further research.
The assumption, and correspondingly the limitation, of this analysis is a constant total price. This means that the platform can only shift fees from one side of the market to the other but cannot increase the sum of the prices. Therefore, it cannot be stated that monopoly power in two-sided markets is always beneficial. However, it can be concluded that market power in two-sided market is not (always) harmful and competition not (always) the preferred option. Hence, antitrust cases in twosided markets should take a more in-depth look at the effect of market power before deciding that competition is always best for consumers and should be backed by all means.
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